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France has participated in airstrikes against Islamic state forces in Iraq, but has so far stopped short of
involvement in Syria. Rachel Utley writes on the competing motivations underpinning the French
policy on the conflict. She notes that the threat of terrorism has been a key driver of French
involvement, which was underlined by the murder of French hostage Hervé Gourdel in Algeria.
However the staunch opposition of the French government to the Assad regime in Syria, combined
with the threat of domestic terrorism within France itself, have resulted in a difficult balance having
to be struck by François Hollande over the issue.
Almost three weeks have passed since France’s first contribution to US-led air strikes over Iraq.
With no sign of the imminent (or otherwise) eradication of Islamic State (or ‘Daesh’ as the French government refers
to the organisation) in Iraq or Syria, France’s formal military commitment to the international campaign is increasing.
The apparent contrast between France’s reluctance to intervene in Iraq in 2003, and the current status as the first of
the US’ major western allies to join air strikes in 2014, has not been lost on observers. Direct linkage between the
two, however, is misleading. President Hollande’s decision of 18 September to commit to air strikes in fact reflects
two different features. The first is the longer-term appreciation of the increased terrorist threat facing France. The
second is France’s stance under Hollande’s presidency over protracted problems in the Middle East and North
Africa region, not least of which is Syria. However, despite the determination to act against IS/Daesh and to combat
the dangers of terrorism, questions arise from France’s actions which are not easily answered.
The increased perception of terrorist threat
Hollande’s decision to contribute to US-led air strikes over Iraq was explicitly linked to threats of terrorism. This was
partly a matter of responding to requests for assistance against terrorist advances from the legitimate Iraqi
government, thus preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the legitimate Iraqi state. It was also a matter
of preventing the extension of the threat posed by Islamist terrorism to France and Europe. Echoes of the
intervention in Mali from January 2013 are not coincidental.
The perception of French vulnerability to terrorist attack is not new, dating back at least to the 1970s. By the 1990s,
the principal threat to French security and interests emerged from the Groupe Islamique Armé  (GIA) linked to the
ongoing civil war in Algeria. The events of 11 September 2001 accentuated the perception of threat, which was
further exacerbated in 2002 by a bomb attack in Karachi which killed eleven French naval engineers, and an attack
on the French oil tanker Limburg off the coast of Yemen. Both attacks were claimed or attributed to Al Qaeda
affiliates.
By 2005, the GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat – formerly the GIA) had designated France its
principal enemy, at least in part in reaction to the passage of France’s law on secularism in 2004; and following the
GSPC’s affiliation with Al Qaeda in 2006, threats against France were explicit. By 2008 President Nicolas Sarkozy
maintained that ‘the most immediate threat is that of a terrorist attack’; while in 2010 Prime Minister Fillon insisted
‘We are at war with Al Qaeda.’
Moreover, the threat emanates as much from within as outside France. GIA terrorism in the 1990s was effective at
least in part due to the existence of pre-positioned cells in France. In the period since 9/11, a succession of terrorist
plots against targets in France are said to have been thwarted, recently including threats against Jewish targets, the
national nuclear power infrastructure, and high-profile tourist attractions.
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Not all attacks have been averted. In 2012, for example,
the gunman Mohamed Merah killed seven and injured
two others, having apparently claimed links to Al Qaeda
and travelled to both Afghanistan and Pakistan. And in
2013, a soldier was repeatedly stabbed at La Défense
on the outskirts of Paris; the radicalisation of the
perpetrator was already known to police. Indeed
radicalisation within France (as elsewhere) is a
considerable problem. By autumn 2014, Foreign
Minister Fabius argued that almost one thousand
French citizens or residents had joined or sought to join
IS/Daesh in Iraq and Syria, and the topic was also on
the agenda when Prime Minister Valls visited UK Prime
Minister David Cameron in London earlier this month.
Consequently the rapid progress of IS/Daesh over the
course of 2014, the rate of its territorial expansion and
ambition, the scale of its challenge to existing states in
the region and those beyond, alongside the depth of
threats to France, all weighed on Hollande’s decision to commit to air strikes against targets in Iraq.
The problem of Syria
However, France has specifically not made the same commitment to date in respect of targets in Syria. In some
ways, given the strength of French rhetoric against Assad, and the will to reinforce that rhetoric with military
intervention after the use of chemical weapons in August 2013, this might seem to jar.
Both Hollande and Fabius have been undiplomatically outspoken against the Assad regime since Hollande came to
office. The logical corollary was the decision that France would work to unify the more moderate opposition forces in
Syria, offering political, financial and humanitarian support, as well as undertaking bilateral and multilateral
diplomatic initiatives to garner international backing for the anti-Assad forces. Military support and equipment were
also made available, and special forces were covertly engaged in Syria within months of Hollande’s election. After
the 2013 chemical weapons attacks, France was at the forefront of pressures for international military intervention
against the Assad regime.
In contrast, the reasons for French reluctance one year on are inherently linked to the rationale for intervention
against IS/Daesh in Iraq, namely the significance of the threat, and the salience of sovereign state legitimacy.
Explicitly for France, and notwithstanding the threat posed, the Assad regime does not have legitimacy. Thus
Hollande and his government are particularly averse to the prospect of intervention in Syria with the logical outcome
that if IS/Daesh is weakened, the hold of Assad over his territory and peoples may be strengthened.
Moreover, there is a strong sense that had intervention occurred a year ago, the present problems with IS/Daesh
would be less acute. For these reasons the French government has robustly endeavoured to square the circle.
Fabius has emphasised that ‘France cannot do everything’; while Hollande stated that: ‘We want to weaken
[IS/Daesh]. We want to quash it, but we also know that as long as there is no resolution to the Syria crisis, all of our
efforts may be undermined, so the challenge is not only to act against Daesh but also to achieve a political solution.
We, France, support the Syrian opposition, the democratic opposition. We consider it the sole representative of the
Syrian people.’
More questions than answers?
The difficulties with this position are numerous. In military terms, France’s contribution to US-led air strikes is very
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small, and its limitation to targets in Iraq reduces its military impact still further. The promise to enhance the
operational tempo of the French contribution through additional deployments currently under way is of little use
given the consolidation of IS/Daesh in Syria, and the extent of its continuing operations there.
In strategic terms, the effective identification of a two-front battle against IS/Daesh and the Assad regime is not
entirely helpful, when the means to address the problems have not been forthcoming. But it may be significant that
recent statements by Fabius and Defence Minister Le Drian have been equivocal on this matter, testing the water
perhaps in respect of an extension of operations to targets in Syria. ‘Mission creep’ would be neither welcome nor
necessarily sustainable in view of the already extended nature of France’s military engagements.
Recognising that military resources are not the only ones with relevance, it is also likely that France is positioning for
a stronger diplomatic role as the conflict progresses. The international conference on Iraq held in Paris in
September, like previous international meetings held over Syria, would emphasise this view. But it is difficult to
perceive of France as a credible broker, either in Iraq where there are still fences to mend given previous French
relations with that country, or in Syria when French aid in all forms to the opposition hardly makes for a disinterested
party.
And as Hollande and his ministers point out, threats to France are also to be found closer to home. While there are
some questions about capacity to affect the external situation, the same can be said of the internal challenges.
Weaknesses of policing, intelligence and coordination have all been recently exposed. And dealing with
radicalisation at source is problematic, not least in a society whose secular legal frameworks have the perceived
effect of disproportionate discrimination against the Muslim population in France.
‘We will continue to fight against terrorism wherever it may be, and in particular against the group we call
Daesh…’
In these terms, after the murder of the French hostage Hervé Gourdel in retaliation for French air strikes against
IS/Daesh in Iraq, President François Hollande insisted that France’s participation in the US-led campaign would
continue. To date, public opinion has been supportive. The difficulty arises that these measures as implemented so
far are unlikely to achieve the desired outcomes, and may even stoke the problems they are intended to address. At
this point, the challenges of IS/Daesh in Syria, and the ongoing problem for France of the continuation of the Assad
regime, are unmet. The potential contradictions of French policy to date in addressing the multiple facets of this
broader problem are very exposed.
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